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Greenwood: The Recognition Of Bystander Recovery

THE RECOGNITION OF BYSTANDER RECOVERY
Clarence Greenwood
INTRODUCTION
A mother standing some distance from her young child witnesses
the negligent killing of her child. As a result, the mother suffers
severe mental trauma and resultant physical injury. The injuries are
caused solely by the mother's apprehension for her child's safety. Will
the mother be allowed to prosecute a claim for relief for the mental
distress and physical consequences she suffered?'
Welsh v. Davis2 involved a bystander claim for relief similar to the
classic case posed above. This note will review the Montana federal
district court's analysis of the Montana law on bystander recovery in
Welsh. It will discuss the common law, the impact and the zone of
danger rules which have traditionally barred bystander recovery for
severe mental distress and resultant physical injury. The note will then
turn to an analysis of two recent cases which abandoned the traditional
rules and allowed a bystander to recover. Finally, the policy considerations underlying denial and support of recovery will be discussed
and the proper rule recommended.
The Welsh case involved a husband's claim for relief for mental
distress and resultant physical injury incurred when he witnessed an
automobile accident in which his wife was injured. The defendant moved
to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for relief. The federal district court,
under the Erie doctrine, granted the dismissal. In doing so, Judge
Smith noted that Montana appeared to have adopted the zone of danger
rule. 4 There was no evidence, however, that the Montana supreme
court would adopt the rule of reasonable foreseeability as the Cali5
fornia supreme court had done.
THE HISTORICAL DENIAL OF BYSTANDER RECOVERY
Courts have generally denied bystander recovery for mental distress
and resultant physical injury, when caused solely by the witnessing of

1

Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal.2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33
(1963); Dillon v. Legg, 60 Cal.2d 208, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968);
Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 598, 249 N.E.2d 419, 201 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969);
Neiderman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970).
'Welsh v. Davis, 307 F. Supp. 416 (W.D. Mont. 1969) [hereinafter referred to as

Welsh].

sErie v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
'The Montana supreme court has never directly ruled on an issue of bystander recovery. It has ruled that fright can cause physical injury which is actionable. Cashin
v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 96 Mont. 92, 28 P.2d 862, 866 (1934). It later affirmed
that position by in effect stating the zone of danger rule. Kelly v. Lowney & Williams, Inc., 113 Mont. 385, 126 P.2d 486, 488 (1942).
'Dillion v. Legg, supra note 1.
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negligent injury to another.6 The reason for this denial is traceable
to the common law reluctance to recognize mental peace as a protectable interest 7 and the duty doctrine which evolved therefrom.8
The common law rule is exemplified by Lord Wensleydale's statement, "Mental pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does not
pretend to redress when the unlawful act complained of causes that
alone.
...9 The common law did allow recovery for mental distress,
however, as a "parasitic" damage.' 0 Mental distress has since been
recognized as an interest worthy and capable of legal protection, when
the act is purposely committed to cause mental distress." Where the act
causing the mental distress is merely negligent, however, the law has
extended only hesitant protection.' 2 Recovery in these cases is limited
to those involving severe physical consequences.' s Further, the plaintiff
must demonstrate that the defendant breached a duty owed to him.
The impact rule and zone of danger rule have traditionally been used
to define the scope of the duty owed a plaintiff.
The impact rule 14 denies recovery to a plaintiff, who suffered severe
mental distress and resultant physical injury from a negligent act,
unless there was simultaneously some physical touching of the plaintiffhowever slight.' 5 Although the impact rule enjoyed a majority position
at one time, it has been unanimously repudiated in the recent case
law.' 6
The zone of danger rule denies recovery to a plaintiff, who suffers severe mental trauma and resultant physical injury from a negligent act, unless the plaintiff was so near the accident that it can be
alleged that the fright was caused by the plaintiff's apprehension for
his own immediate physical safety.17 Recovery by a plaintiff beyond

PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 333 (4th ed. 1971) [herinafter cited as Prosser].
Lynch v. Night, 11 Eng. Rep. 854 (1861); Comment, Bystander Recovery for Mental
Distress, 37 FORDHAm L. REv. 429 (1969).
8
Note, 43 N.Y.U. L. Rzv. 1252 (1968).
*Lynch v. Knight, supra note 7.
1PROSSER, supra note 6 at 331; T. STREET, THE FOUNDATION or LEGAL LrABILrry
460 (1906).
"RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 2D § 46 (1965).
"There has been a general denial of recovery for the negligent infliction of mental
distress unaccompanied by physical consequences with the exception of the telegraph
and corpus cases. PRossE.R, supra note 6 at 329; Note, 21 CORNELL L. RV. 166 (1935).
uPRossE&, supra note 6 at 330.
uSpade v. Lynn & B. R. Co., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897); Mitchell v. Rochester
Ry. Co., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
"For a collection of case examples see PRoSSER, supra note 6 at 331.
'Daley v. La Croix, 384 Mich. 4, 179 N.W.2d 390 (1970); Whetham v. Bismarck
Hospital, 197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972); Neiderman v. Brodsky, supra note 1;
Battalla v. State of New York, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34
(1961); Stewart v. Gilliam, 271 So.2d 466 (Fla. 1973); Hughes v. Moore, 214 Va.
27, 197 S.E.2d 214 (1973).
17
Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935); Tobin v. Grossman, supra
note 1; Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., aupra note 1.
6W.

7

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol35/iss2/10

2

Greenwood: The Recognition Of Bystander Recovery
MONTANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

the zone of danger is barred on the theory that the defendant breached
no duty 8 owed to the plaintiff.
Correlative to the impact and zone of danger rules is the rule that
a bystander cannot recover for fright induced physical injury, when
the fright is caused by fear for the safety of another.19 The theory,
again, is that the defendant has breached no duty owned to the plaintiff
and therefore is not liable to the bystander in a jurisdiction requiring
some physical touching of the plaintiff. 21 The denial of bystander re2
covery in jurisdictions following the zone of danger rule is not so clear. 1
The zone of danger theory is premised upon the idea that fright can
cause severe mental trauma and physical injury. Accepting this latter
proposition, it seems quite arbitrary to distinguish fright induced mental
trauma and resultant physical injury when caused by fear for oneself
from fright induced mental trauma and resultant physical injury when
caused by fear for a loved one's safety. 23 Yet, this is what the courts
have done.
THE RULE OF REASONABLE FORESEEABILITY
FIRST CALIFORNIA-NOW MICHIGAN?
As discussed above, the courts have been very hesitant to recognize
mental peace as an interest worthy and capable of legal protection.
Even today the fear of fraudulent claims 24 has lead the majority of
courts to use execptions 25 from the traditional tort rules in analyzing
mental distress cases.2 6 Recently, the California supreme court 27 and the
Michigan court of appeals 28 both allowed a mother (bystander) to
recover for mental trauma and resultant physical injuries caused by her
witnessing the negligent killing of her young child. In doing so, both
courts rejected the zone of danger rule and adopted the general tort
29
rule of reasonable foreseeability in defining the duty owed the mother.
18PRossa, supra note 6, § 54.
"Id. at 333.
2DId.
2mid.
=Id.
"Once accepting the view that a plaintiff threatened with an injurious impact may
recover for bodily harm resulting from shock without impact . . . to hinge recovery
on the speculative issue whether the parent was shocked through fear for herself
or for her children would be discreditable to any system of jurisprudence." Magruder,
Mental and Eimotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HAv. L. R. 1033, 1039
(1936).
"Note, 43 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1252 (1968).
'Either the impact rule or zone of danger rule.
'This is despite heavy criticism of the exceptions by the legal writers, most of whom
favor a resort to the traditional rules of tort analysis. PROSSER, supra note 6 at 334;
2 HARPER 4 JAMES, LAW OF TORTS 1036 (1956); Amdursky, The Interest in Mental
Tranquility, 13 BUFFALO L. REv. 339 (1963); Magruder, supra note 23.
Dillion v. Legg, supra note 1.
'Toms v. McConnell, 45 M.C.A. 647, 207 N.W.2d 140 (1973).
2HARPER 41 JAMES, supra note 26 at 1018; RESTATEMENT or TORTS 2D § 435 (1965).
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In Dillon v. Legg a mother and two young daughters were crossing
a street when one daughter was struck by an auto and killed. The California supreme court, in a four to three opinion, ruled the mother's claim
for relief was sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss despite the
fact that she was not in the zone of danger.8 0 In the process, the California supreme court artfully portrayed the arbitrariness of the distinction between fright caused by fear for oneself and fright caused by fear
for another:
The case thus illustrates the fallacy of the rule that would deny
recovery in one situation and grant it in the other. In the first place,
we can hardly justify relief to the sister for trauma which she
suffered upon apprehension of the child's death and yet deny it to
the mother merely because of a happenstance that the sister was
some few yards closer to the accident.'
The California court also graphically illustrated the confusion which
exists in other jurisdictions3 2 as a result of the reluctance to recognize
mental distress as an interest capable of legal protection:
The history of the cases does not show the development of a logical
rule, but rather a series of changes and abandonments. Upon the
argument in each situation the courts draw a Maginot Line to withstand an onslaught of false claims, the cases have assumed a variety
of postures. At first they insisted that there be no recovery for
emotional trauma at all. .

.

. Retreating from this position they

gave relief for such trauma only if physical iimpact occurred ...
They then abandoned the requirement for physical impact but insisted that the victim fear for her own safety, holding a mother
could recover for fear for her child's safety if she simultaneously
entertained a personal fear for herself.'
The California supreme court, however, stopped short of complete reliance upon the rule of reasonable foreseeability in defining the duty
owed a bystander. The fear of fraudulent claims and inability to limit
the extent of liability led the court to adopt three guidelines to aid
in determining the duty owed: (1) whether the plaintiff was located
near the scene of the accident .. . (2) whether the shock resulted from

a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident ... and (3) whether plaintiff and victim
were closely related. . . .4 These standards have been critized on the

basis that they inherently contain the possibility of mechanical application-the very thing the court was trying to overcome by rejecting
the mechanical zone of danger rule.33

The subsequent California case

36
law, however, has shown this fear to be unfounded.

8Dillion v. Legg, supra note 1 at 915.
tm
ld.
82
See, dissent Resavage v. Davies, 199 Md. 479, 86 A.2d 879 (1952); Comment, Bystander tecovery for Mental Distress, 37 FORDHAm L. REv. 429, 441 (1969).
83
Dillion v. Legg, supra note 1 at 924.
'Id. at 920.
3'Note, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1252 (1968).
8Archibald v. Braverman, 275 Cal. App.2d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723, (Court of Appeals,
3d Cir. 1969); Capeloute v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 7 Cal.3d 889, 500 P.2d
880, 103 Cal. Rptr. 856 (1972).
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The Michigan court of appeals was presented with a similar situation
in Toms v. McConnell. 37 There a mother, while standing in the family
home, witnessed the negligent killing of her young daughter outside.
As a result, she suffered severe mental distress and resultant physical
injury. The Michigan court of appeals, noting that the Michigan supreme
court had recently rejected the iimpact rule,3 8 upheld the mother's claim
for relief. Unlike California, the Michigan court of appeals fully relied
upon the rule of reasonable foreseeability in defining the duty owed.3 9
In so doing, the Michigan court of appeals would seem to have taken the
final step in giving full recognition to mental distress as an interest
that is not only worthy of complete protection, but one which the law
40
is capable of fully protecting.
TIE POLICY ARGUMENTS
Although numerous policy arguments are advanced for and against
the adoption of the rule of reasonable foreseeability, 4 ' the controversy
revolves around two basic premises. The policy basis for the traditional
rules is that, although mental peace is worthy of legal protection, it
is not an interest which the courts are capable of protecting because of
the threat of a flood of fraudulent claims.42 The policy argument in
favor of the rule of reasonable foreseeability is that where a substantial
wrong is done a remedy should be provided by the legal system.43
The threat of a flood of fraudulent claims is a real one.44 For that
reason most agree that recovery should not be allowed for trivial emotional disturbance. 45 But where the mental distress is severe enough to
cause physical injuries, the threat of fictitious claims palls in light of
the advances in medical science.4 6 The leading recent case denying bystander recovery admitted as much in dictum: ". . . mental traumatic
causation can now be diagnosed almost as well as physical traumatic
causation. '47 A second weakness of the fraudulent claims argument is
the artificial distinction it draws between types of fright-induced physical
injury. Jurisdictions, which follow the zone of danger rule, are admitting
that they can distinguish fraudulent claims of mental traumatic causaT
87
oms v. McConnell, supra note 28.
wDaley v. La Croix, supra note 16.
8Toms v. McConnel, supra note 28 at 144.
10For a discussion of the steps the courts have taken in recognizing mental distress
as an interest which is worthy and capable of legal protection see Amdursky, supra
note 26.
"PROSSER,supra note 6 at 327.
"Waube v. Warrington, supra note 17; Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., supra
note 1; Tobin v. Grossman, supra note 1.
'Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., supra note 1 at 520, 531; Dillion v. Legg,
supra note 1 at 917, 922; Tobin v. Grossman, supra note 1 at 422.
"PROSSER, supra note 6 at 328.
"Id.
4
81d.

"Tobin v. Grossman, supra note 1 at 421.
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tion from legitimate ones, when severe mental trauma is caused by fear
for one's own physical safety. 48 These same jurisdictions, by denying
bystander recovery, are holding that they cannot draw this distinction
when the fright induced physical injury is caused by fear for a loved
one's safety. 49 The incongruity of this is patent. Third, the threat of
fraudulent claims is simply a theoretical argument-a fear. 50 There
is no factual evidence that the courts in jurisdictions allowing bystander
recovery have been or will be faced with a rash of fraudulent claims
with which they cannot cope. 51
The policy argument, that where a substantial wrong exists the
courts should provide a remedy, is in the best of the common law
tradition.52 This argument discounts the threat of fraudulent claims in
light of modern advances in medical science and the practical experience
of jurisdictions allowing bystander recovery. Continued adherence to
the traditional rules, according to this argument, leaves an interest
deserving protection unprotected,53 fails to make allowance for aggravated
circumstances, 5 4 and denies any remedy for substantial wrongs. 55
CONCLUSION
The law with regard to bystander recovery is clearly unsettled.
Traditionally a bystander has been denied the right to recover for
severe mental distress and resultant physical injury. The reason proffered is that the interest in mental peace is not protectable because of
the inability of courts to distinguish fraudulent claims from legitimate
ones.
It now appears, because of advances in medical science and the
practical experience of jurisdictions allowing some bystander recovery,
that the fraudulent claims fear is groundless. It is submitted that in
the future courts should recognize the negligent infliction of severe
mental distress upon a bystander as a wrong not only worthy of legal
redress, but one which the courts are capable of handling through use of
traditional tort principles. 56

"Magruder, supra note 23.
oId.
wNote, 15 STANv. L. REv. 740 (1963).
5
Archibald v. Braverman, supra note 36 at 725; Note, 15 STAN. L. REv. 740 (1963).
'Battalla v. State of New York, upra note 16 at 240.
5
sAmdursky, supra note 26.
"Hopper v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 314, 318 (D. Colo. 1965).
rDillion v. Legg, upra note 1 at 917, 922.
"Amdursky, 8upra note 26 at 353.
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